THE New Republic

Can We Cut Taxes Without Inflation?

Page 3

How To Start Disengagement

Last of Three Articles by Denis Healey

Money and the Art of Irony

By REED WHITTEMORE

Bourguiba Shifts His Bet . . . . . *Jean Daniel*
What Makes the Mare Go . . . *Gerald Johnson*
Mr. Britten Turns the Screw . . *Robert Evett*
The Stories of Camus . . . . . *Irving Howe*

MARCH 31, 1958

25 cents

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Washington Wire

It's Make Believe—

IT IS NEVER EASY to distinguish the real from the make-believe in Washington. This is particularly so in two such knotty problems as the recession and farm aid, but the attempt can be made.

In the recession the real point is that the Administration is pretending to take stronger recovery steps than it is actually taking, all the time hoping that the slump will cure itself with a minimum of federal aid as it did in 1948-9 and in 1953-4. Democrats, of course, are sitting pretty; they can make recommendations without responsibility. The Administration was late in discovering the recession (which started last July) and it has been absurdly over-optimistic since, as when Eisenhower predicted in February that things would look up in "March."

The Administration is still stalling for time. But this wait-and-see attitude is increasingly dangerous. Arthur F. Burns, America's foremost authority on the business cycle, urges a $5 billion tax cut—at once. The Committee for Economic Development, a highly respected business organization, suggests an April deadline.

While the Administration vacillates, it is offering a series of make-believe moves. This propaganda is designed to fool you. Three recent examples show astute Jim Hagerty working overtime. The Administration pushed out a post office bill as a "$2-billion anti-recession" measure which turned out to be an ordinary four-year construction program (who thinks the recession will last four years?). It offered a "$2.255 billion" accelerated public works program which momentarily dazzled White House reporters till it turned out that the federal government was actually obligating itself to only $75 million in new money. Finally the President called last week's much heralded conference of nine governors to launch a program to extend state unemployment insurance. The governors came, thinking the Treasury would pay for the extension. Some of the governors still thought so, amazingly enough, after an hour and a half explanation at the White House. They were politely disabused later on by a "spokesman" for the President who said the Treasury would *loan* money, not give money. Sophisticated AP news analyst James Marlow (one of the best columnists in the country) wrote that in his 15 years of Washington experience he had "never seen anything more fouled up." But the fouling up was simply that the real and make-believe clashed. The fact is, it's still "wait-and-see" over the hair-curling recession problem at the White House. Eisenhower hates to move.

Or Simple Ignorance?

FACTS AND MAKE-BELIEVE clash on the farm problem, too.

Like it or not farm population is shrinking. A century ago 65 percent of Americans lived on farms; a year ago 12 percent. Someday US food needs may be supplied by a mere 500,000 commercial farmers. To encourage farmers to boost their output the government set price supports at high levels in World War II. Immense surpluses are still jamming warehouses. Another disagreeable fact is that prices at the farm may decline but city food prices stay high.

The make-believe comes in the political panaceas offered to take care of this situation. General Eisenhower pledged —or seemed to pledge—"full (100 percent) parity" in his famous Kasson, Minn., 1952 campaign speech. That was either make-believe, or simple ignorance.

Now the Democratic Congress (with some GOP support) has sent to the White House a bill to freeze high farm price supports for one year. This, too, is offered as an "anti-recession" measure, and with more justice than some of the White House proposals. Eisenhower will veto the bill, and Congress lacks the vote to override the veto. The measure was voted largely to put Ike on the spot.

Eisenhower's Gallup Poll rating is down to 52 percent, a new low. The anti-Benson revolt is spreading in the farm states which are normally Republican. It looks good for the Democrats.

And yet long-range questions must be asked. Indefinite continuation of high price support subsidies for a diminishing farm minority seems impossible. City consumers have rights, too. The Senate Anti-Monopoly Subcommittee wanted to investigate the middleman's spread on farm prices, but the Democratic leadership said "No." It will be a strange reversal of political tradition if the Democrats permanently identify themselves with the Farm Bloc, while Republicans edge over into the position of friend of the consumer and city man.

Notes

THE BIG CANADIAN election comes March 31; the recession is worse there than in the US (10 percent unemployed as against 6.5 percent here). . . . Maine's Democratic Governor Edmund Muskie will run for the Senate this fall against colorless Republican Sen. Fred Payne with the best party chances in years; Knowland now backs Nixon for the GOP Presidential nomination in '60 which cinches the thing. . . . Nothing will now stop an anti-recession tax cut except a next-to-miraculous business upturn, which will have to come right away. . . . Rep. Charles Wolverton (R, N.J.) looked silly when after self-righteously denouncing Congressional pressure on the FCC, his own brusque 1953 demand on the FCC unexpectedly came out; "There's no impropriety, hearing's adjourned," said sympathetic Chairman Oren Harris (D, Ark.). . . . There's nothing wrong with Congressmen intervening in behalf of constituents but our system requires commissioners with character enough to reject impertinent encroachments (unlike some recent appointees). . . . Reviewers who criticize J. Edgar Hoover's *Masters of Deceit* (a new but dated exposure of Communist subversion) report scurrilous mail; he's still a national idol. . . . Washington was covered ankle deep last week with a species of wet snow like lemon sherbet; the Cherry Blossom Festival will be held just the same—without blossoms.

T.R.B.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The New Republic
A JOURNAL OF OPINION

1244 NINETEENTH ST., N.W.
WASHINGTON 6, D. C.

VOL. 138, NO. 13, ISSUE 2263
MARCH 31, 1958

THE WEEK 3

Spring Is Late; Texas and Taxes; Turn Little Glow Worm; Bad Gamble in Indonesia; A Pledge to India; Migrant Workers; Closed Circuit on RCA—II

ARTICLES 7

How Long Will Bourguiba Last? by Jean Daniel

Germany: The Missile Base Alarm by Terence Prittie

The Superficial Aspect by Gerald W. Johnson

Money and the Art of Irony by Reed Whittemore

The Case for Disengagement—III by Denis Healey

BOOKS 17

MUSIC 22

GILBERT A. HARRISON, *Editor & Publisher*
MICHAEL STRAIGHT, *Editor-at-Large*
HELEN FULLER, *Managing Editor*
SELIG S. HARRISON, *Associate Editor*
ROBERT EVETT, *Book & Music Editor*
F. R. Ruskin, *Asst. to the Publisher*
Contributing Editors: Alexander M. Bickel, Frank Getlein, B. H. Haggin, Irving Howe, Gerald W. Johnson, James E. King, Jr., Donald Malcolm, Helen Hill Miller

Published weekly (except for omissions of four summer issues) and distributed to newsstands by the Eastern News Company, N. Y. 14, N. Y. Phone: REpublic 7-8656. Entered as second-class matter September 26, 1950, at the post office at Washington, D. C., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Single copy, 25¢; Yearly subscription, $8.00; Foreign, $9.00. Armed Forces personnel or students, $5.00. Subscribers desiring change of address should notify us at least three weeks in advance. Please include both old and new addresses. Copyright, 1958, by Harrison-Blaine, Inc.

Correspondence

► *Adams & the FCC Scandal*

SIRS:

BEING a Republican and an Ike man, I naturally disagree with most of what you say; but you put the case for the opposition well and persuasively. However, I was greatly surprised and shocked at the manner in which TRB

(*Continued on page 24*)

Spring Is Late

SPRING, Herblock tells us on the following page, will be a little late this year. And even some of the most undismayed optimists among the economic forecasters are coming to accept his view. The economist of a large business organization told an off-the-record luncheon last week, reports the *Journal of Commerce* (March 24):

> Resignations have been pouring in to the "Six Months Club," the name that had been given those economists and others who looked for business to decline steadily until June 30 and then begin to stage a brisk recovery in July. Some seem to have formed a new organization "The Some Time After Labor Day Club." Others are just groping around.

Professor Sumner Slichter is changing his view too. Last November and again on March 3 in *The New Republic* he predicted an end to the downturn in March or "May at the latest." Dr. Slichter put great stress on the fact that the recession was not spreading outside the durable goods sector of the economy and that consumer spending had declined scarcely at all. "Tax cuts," Dr. Slichter said in his March 3 article, "would be a mistake."

A new set of *Economic Indicators* has appeared since then. And Dr. Slichter now writes (the *Nikon Keipai Shimbun* of Tokyo on March 19), that "The recession is getting deeper."

"Is it likely," Dr. Slichter now asks

> that consumers, who already owe $43 billion in short-term medium-term indebtedness, who have shown a very lukewarm disposition to buy most of the 1958 cars, and who cannot escape being influenced by the contraction itself, will be willing to continue to incur new installment debts at the rate of $42 billion a year or more? Unless they do incur new debts at this rate or more, consumer credit will contract and this contraction will aggravate the recession and delay the upturn.

If that happens, Dr. Slichter's latest analysis goes on, "the government will need to reconsider its fiscal policies"—*i.e.* cut taxes.

Dr. Arthur F. Burns, with new-found boldness (since his resignation as chairman of President Eisenhower's Council of Economic Advisers) has been privately telling associates for several months that the recession is building up dangerous momentum. Now he has publicly called for an immediate, permanent $5 billion tax cut plus other emergency measures. "If we delay more than a few weeks in the hope that economic recovery will come on its own by midyear," he warns, "we shall be taking the risk of having to resort later to drastic medicine."

If Dr. Burns—and others, such as Sen. Paul Douglas—prove to be right, the Democratic leadership of Congress will be as much to blame as the Administration. The Democratic-controlled Congress could increase

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

purchasing power almost immediately by voting to lower or temporarily "forgive" withholding taxes on income and certain excise taxes. The fact is that Democrats might already have rushed some kind of tax cut through the Congress had not Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson and Speaker Rayburn used considerable muscle to prevent it.

Johnson and Rayburn have been rightly concerned lest we rush into large tax cuts that might prove unnecessary—and inflationary. But the deepening recession which the March figures document justifies the risk, as Dr. Burns declares. We predict that many more members of Congress will agree when they have talked to the voters in their home districts during the Easter Recess. And the Democratic chiefs will probably start leading in that direction about April 15 in order to stay in front of the troops. (President Eisenhower is not expected to join in anything so drastic until the April employment figures come out in mid-May.)

Having taken that fateful step, Johnson and Rayburn could prove their political, as well as economic, foresight by concentrating on holding down inflation.

Because most of our basic industries operate on a system of "administered prices," set by industry rather than by the old law of supply and demand, price indexes have continued to rise even during the recession. Prices are sure to climb higher as demand for goods rises after taxes are cut—unless something is done to stabilize price levels.

Several suggested ways of doing this without imposing strict controls over prices and wages were presented to the Senate Anti-Monopoly Subcommittee last summer. The Congressional Joint Economic Committee has hearings on the subject scheduled in May. Mechanisms such as those proposed by economists Gardner Means, Gerhard Colm and Kenneth Galbraith are clearly in order. As a beginning, they would establish a system to examine proposed major shifts in price and wage policy and report on cases which would violate the public welfare. This would serve as a warning to industry and labor that the public is watching—and if that should not work, there are always controls.

Texas and Taxes

IMPARTIAL observers of Texans have for some years noticed among them a certain partiality to their native state, a certain tendency to use Texas as a measuring rod in considering other areas. So it occurs to us that the economics of Texas may be reflected in national economic policy to an extent worth underlining. After all, remember that:

► The Senate Majority Leader, Lyndon B. Johnson, is from Texas

► The Speaker of the House, Sam Rayburn, is from Texas

► The Secretary of the Treasury, Robert B. Anderson, is from Texas

► Watrous B. Ions, member of the five-man Open Market Committee of the Federal Reserve, is from Texas.

A year ago, rains broke a six-year drought in Texas. As a result, in 1957, the average net income per Texas farm, including inventory accumulation, rose by 56 percent. For the owners of the 7.7 million cattle and the 4.9 million sheep in Texas on January 1, 1958, prospects are even better: animal numbers and meat prices are both up.

And while green pastures on the surface of Texas geography produced greenbacks, Texas subsoil was also higher-yield. At the wellhead, Texas crude oil production brought an estimated $3.2 billion in 1956, but an estimated $3.5 billion in 1957.

So there continues to be plenty to do in Texas. At the beginning of 1957, when the national percentage of unemployment among insured workers was 3.7, it was 1.7 in Texas; at the beginning of 1958, the Texas figure was only 2.7 when the national figure had risen to 6.8. Even the latest figure puts Texas at 3.8—just about the na-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tional rate in a good year and less than half of the current national rate of 7.9.

We offer these figures as at least a partial explanation of the wait-and-see attitude toward a tax cut exhibited by top leadership at the Treasury, in the Fed, on the Hill.

Turn Little Glow Worm

DESPITE Russia's detonation of three H-bombs in five days during one recent week and the scheduling of H-bomb tests by the United States to take place in the Pacific this spring, it is encouraging to note the dangerous glow worm of radiation is beginning to turn—at least at one end. In recent months, local, state and federal agencies have taken steps to protect the public against indiscriminate exposure to man-made radiation of the "peaceful use" variety:

►Michigan has adopted regulations governing the use of radioactive isotopes, X-radiation and all other forms of ionizing radiation.

►New York has adopted regulations prohibiting the use of radioactive materials, X-ray machines and similar radiation-producing equipment on human beings by anyone not licensed to practice medicine, osteopathy, dentistry or podiatry.

►The US Public Health Service has recommended that future mass X-ray surveys for tuberculosis be confined to high risk groups and all X-ray equipment be inspected frequently to guard against unnecessary radiation. The District of Columbia and Virginia have already called a halt to mass X-ray surveys in their high schools.

►Surgeon General Leroy Burney has set up a national committee to advise him on public health aspects of radiation from all sources.

►The Atomic Energy Commission reduced drastically the permissible levels of radiation exposure for both atomic workers and populations near atomic installations.

►New York City's Board of Health at the end of January established rigid controls on the operation and sale of X-ray machines and fluoroscopes as the first step in a projected radiation protection section to be added during the year to the City's sanitary code.

Bad Gamble in Indonesia

BY MUDDLING accident as much as by design the Administration has managed to make almost certain that the uncertain outcome in Indonesia will *not* be to the US advantage. Nominally the US is committed neither to President Sukarno nor to the Padang rebels. But Sukarno knows what *Christian Science Monitor* correspondent Gordon Walker knows—that "the United States would strongly prefer to see the Central Sumatran movement win at least its demands for government reform along non-Communist lines." If Sukarno ever had any doubts, Secretary Dulles dispelled them with his gratuitous critique of Sukarno-style "guided democracy" (*NR*, Feb. 24); Djakarta newspapers (e.g., *The Indonesian Observer*) headlined his comments: "Dulles Backs Rebel Demands."

The United States has gambled for all practical purposes on one particular outcome in a situation which can end in a multitude of ways. The US stands to gain only from a virtual rebel victory which forces Sukarno to yield substantial political concessions. This is still an outside possibility, but it is more likely, informed observers say, that Sukarno will get a settlement on his own terms or at least one involving minimal concessions. What is tragic about our bumbling diplomacy is not only that the gamble in this instance is such a bad one—risk-taking is often as unavoidable in diplomacy as in private life— but that the gamble was so plainly inadvertent. The United States has not, in fact, bolstered the prospects for rebel success. Yet we have acquired the liability for future relations with Sukarno of having seemed to abet his enemies in his hour of trial.

A Pledge to India

> Congress recognizes the importance of the economic development of the Republic of India to its people, to democratic values and institutions and to peace and stability in the world. Consequently it is the sense of the Congress that it is in the interest of the United States to join with other nations in providing support of the type, magnitude and duration adequate to assist India to complete successfully its current program. . . .

WHAT'S in a resolution? A great deal, we believe in the case of the bipartisan pledge which Congress was asked to endorse last week by Sens. John F. Kennedy (D, Mass.) and John Sherman Cooper (R, Ky.). To go on record with a pledge for implied future action is something less, of course, than to enact the $600 million in immediate loan legislation urged recently by Sen. Hubert Humphrey (D, Minn.). But the Kennedy-Cooper resolution is perhaps as much as we should expect of Congress in 1958.

If enacted without protracted debate it could pave the way for Congressional loan legislation in 1959 and, at the same time, help lift India out of its present mood of political and economic despond. By the same token, long and acrimonious debate which ended in burial of the resolution in committee or defeat on the floor would hardly help matters. Those in Congress who appreciate the need for special emphasis on India in our foreign economic policy (does this include Lyndon Johnson?) should press the Kennedy-Cooper initiative to an early conclusion.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Migrant Workers

"MIGRANT workers" on their way to do the hard work of cultivating and harvesting which keeps the nation's supermarkets full of fruits and vegetables must hereafter be treated better than animals being trucked to the stockyards.

The Interstate Commerce Commission has at last set forth its rules for minimum safe and humane treatment of these workers, and is preparing to enforce the law this year with inspectors who will patrol the highways.

The migrants' plight, which had gone unnoticed for years, was brought forcibly to the nation's attention three years ago when an open, ton-and-a-half truck loaded with 55 human beings, packed together and standing up, skidded on a wet Colorado highway and dumped its human contents screaming into the borrow-pit. One baby was killed and more than 20 people hurt. Other such instances came to the eye of Sen. Paul H. Douglas of Illinois: regulation fell into a no-man's land between state and federal authorities—the ICC had been given no power to regulate, and the states could not because most of this movement is in interstate commerce.

Congress finally passed a bill in 1956 giving the ICC power to enforce minimum standards, but enforcement was delayed last year because the contractors, or *padrones,* insisted on hearings. Now, however, the rules are in force. Migrants must hereafter be covered against the weather, must be afforded seats, with 18 inches of space per person; must have a safety exit from the truck or bus, a way to communicate with the driver, and a safe way to get in and out, such as a firm ladder with handholds. They cannot be driven more than six hours straight without a 30-minute meal stop, and without at least one interim rest-stop. As for drivers and vehicles they must meet minimum standards too; and the drivers must rest at least eight hours, after a driving shift of not more than 10 hours. It's nice to know we can afford such scanty bounty to the poorest among us.

Closed Circuit on RCA—II

ANATOMISTS of bigness in the American economy, students of how weight, and even overweight, can be gracefully thrown around, could have no more fascinating body to study than that of the Radio Corporation of America.

From one Administration to another, at least up to now, RCA has bipartisanly known the right people. It has known the right people in the Pentagon to keep up with basic changes in fundamental electronics and obtain important contracts as a supplier; it has become the subsequent employer of some of these people. It has known the right people at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue, and become the subsequent employer of some of them.

In 1940, under the leadership of the late Sen. Charles W. Tobey, hearings of the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce brought out information on what happened to the government antitrust case against RCA brought in 1930. According to testimony, RCA had hired former Sen. George Moses to get the case dropped. When President Hoover and Attorney General Mitchell stood pat, RCA next retained Sen. Dan Hastings of Delaware, a member of the Republican National Committee's executive committee, who was alleged to have passed on part of his fee to the clerk of the US District court in Wilmington.

Similarly under the Truman Administration, RCA, in addition to having a radio contract with the President's daughter, hired Clark Clifford upon his return to private law practice—he had been special counsel to the President from 1946 to 1950; it subsequently called in Adlai Stevenson.

And when James P. McGranery was appointed Attorney General in 1952, a tie-in was generally inferred between the sudden switch in attitude toward his confirmation on the part of the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, the late Sen. Pat McCarran, and McGranery's prompt handling of several matters, including dismissal both of the grand jury which had been expected to hear evidence regarding RCA and H. Graham Morison, head of the antitrust division, who had prepared the material on which indictment was sought by the government.

In search for an answer to the question of which is bigger, Washington or the RCA, the part played by the private law suit is worth noting. The theory back of the triple-damage clause in the Antitrust Act is that the resources of smaller firms likely to have been squeezed by monopolists normally do not make possible the prolonged development of material on which to establish their cases, or the retention of legal talent comparable to that of the large corporations. Therefore, material developed by the government in the course of its antitrust prosecutions, after being sustained in court, becomes available to firms suing for damages under the act. Some 82 percent of the triple-damage cases brought under this clause in the law have relied on such data.

But in respect to RCA, from the early case of *Lord v. RCA* to last year's verdict in favor of Zenith Radio in its complaint against RCA, though the government was engaged in various gambits at the time that this litigation was in progress, the only court proof of monopoly so far has been made by private plaintiffs.

So over 30 years, RCA has provided material quite as adapted to serialization as one of NBC's own soap operas. We await the next installment in keen suspense. Will the current Attorney General get farther than his predecessors in respect to a corporation that one Washington lawyer describes as "certainly a factor, possibly a male-factor, in the electronics industry"?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

How Long Will Bourguiba Last?

Tunis

WHAT IS called Tunisian "interventionism" in Algeria should have surprised no one, least of all the French. In the period just after the settlement of the Indo-Chinese affair when French-Tunisian cooperation seemed to symbolize a decisive turning point in French colonial policy—and when French opinion almost unanimously recognized in Habib Bourguiba the most reasonable, the most occidental and the ablest political leader of the Arab world—President Bourguiba was already voicing manifold warnings of the "frightful consequences" of the war in Algeria. Mr. Bourguiba's obsession was then essentially motivated by the divergence between Tunisian and Algerian nationalism. He had unfortunate memories of those Arabs of North Africa who had claimed to feel more French than the French and who, when they had become nationalists, suddenly wanted to give lessons to all the other Arabs. And intuitively, he sensed that the revolutionary force rising in Algeria must jeopardize Tunisia's future and his own policies. Relying on the evolution of French opinion and conscious of the difficulties that beset a young and underdeveloped country achieving independence, he had taken the risks of "Bourguibism": to follow the path toward total sovereignty by gradual stages. His gamble on French evolution immediately aroused an opposition against him headed by his old revolutionary comrade Salah ben Youssef—an opposition which is still not dead and which stirs a little each time French-Tunisian cooperation strikes a reef.

The same criticisms were aimed at him by the Algerian National Liberation Front—the insurrectional organization—which had its headquarters then in Cairo and worked more willingly with the representatives of Ben Youssef than with those of Bourguiba.

But 18 months ago the Tunisian chief shared the doubts of French liberal opinion, the Moroccan Government and of informed American observers on the way the Algerian revolution was developing. It seemed to him that the military leaders who had instituted the insurrection had no clear awareness of the political struggles implied in a war of liberation; nor did he believe they were seriously considering the future of North Africa. Doubtless he recognized that France had followed a policy of depersonalization in Algeria that had destroyed the roots of all Moslem leaders and had turned reformers into fighting men. But the result to be reckoned with was that an Algerian force transformed collaboration with France into veritable apostasy.

Meanwhile, the longer the war went on in Algeria, the more France saw the revival in her own public opinion of the colonialist mentality that had seemed to disappear when the independence of Tunisia and Morocco was recognized.

The feebleness of French statesmen, the political sabotage committed by the Frenchmen of Algeria, the Fascist spirit that war necessarily creates in all the armies of the world, and finally the complexity of the Algerian drama have halted the French evolution on which Bourguiba was gambling. France has thus prevented Bourguiba from winning the bet he decided to make.

But Bourguiba is not the man to let events outrun him. He puts himself at the head of an opposition he cannot beat. Once he saw clearly that France could not achieve the pacification of Algeria; that the Algerian revolution had become so powerful its repression was neither possible nor desirable; that thanks to Soviet aid the nationalisms of the Middle East had become a popular force in his own country, then the Tunisian chief resigned himself to abandoning his lifetime policy: the slow, able, sometimes diabolically insidious, but always singularly effective, influencing of French opinion. The bombardment of Sakiet Sidi Youssef gave him the most spectacular of opportunities to break with this policy.

Before the bombing of Sakiet, Bourguiba—a man of French education, married to a French woman, sentimentally faithful to his childhood friends who are nearly all French—had not yet put his "agonizing reappraisal" completely into operation. But he had begun to commit himself. He had engineered the transfer of the headquarters of the National Liberation Front from Cairo to Tunis. And in Tunisia he did for the Algerian insurgents what France had done for the Spanish Republicans in 1936 and what the United States did for the allies before Pearl Harbor. In short, although Tunisia was not a cobelligerent, her benevolent neutrality amounted to effective cooperation. Bourguiba was not simply playing two hands; he was seeking to maintain a point of contact because he was assured that France was moving toward negotiation with the National Liberation Front.

☆

After Sakiet—literally a traumatic experience for the Tunisians—Bourguiba decided to change his bet. He had to abandon France and accept the fact that she could not solve her Algerian problem. The Western powers had shown that they were really sensitive only to neutralist blackmail in this case. He had to plunge the Americans and the British into the North African situation and thus internationalize the conflict.

Bourguiba has always sought to turn difficulties into advantages and obstacles into stepping stones. A big man in a tiny country, he has probably thought of playing a part in Algeria. Perhaps there is a dream in his mind of a pan-North African role. The war in Algeria has thus been for him at once a hindrance and a springboard.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Essentially a gambler, he is playing his toughest hand.

The reason is that he is profoundly committed to the West, just as he was profoundly committed to cooperation with France. And the chance that he can win the new bet is about as slim as the chance he had on the old one. He allied himself with France against a substantial segment of Tunisian opinion and a large sector of Tunisian opinion opposes his playing on the Occidental side.

Anti-Communist, distrustful of the Middle East, in difficulties with Nasser and the new United Arab Republic, Bourguiba would have great difficulty maintaining himself if the Occident should fail him. He could hardly this time put himself at the head of the mounting opposition.

Obviously he makes valuable use of this agreement in dealing with US representatives. But the fact that he exploits his difficulty does not signify that it is unreal.

While the war in Algeria lasts, the opposition to Bourguiba at home necessarily entrenches itself against the West, which it accuses of providing France with the means of continuing the fight. That is what Bourguiba means when he says to Robert Murphy, the American conciliator in the British-United States "good offices" delegation, that Franco-Tunisian conflicts cannot be resolved without an Algerian settlement.

Nevertheless, it is apparent that the Algerian war will continue, and that is why Bourguiba's only hope is that the Americans and the British will temporarily replace France in Tunisia and in Morocco. They would give him moral support and at the same time constitute a decisive influence on the course of events in Algeria.

The "good offices" undertaking is thus assured of long duration. If the British-American conciliation effort is abandoned without having achieved peace in Algeria, Bourguiba may be swept away by the wave of feeling that is mounting all over the Moghreb area of North Africa against what is called the colonialist complicity of the Western peoples.

JEAN DANIEL

MR. DANIEL *is North African correspondent for the liberal Paris weekly* Express.

THE BASE THAT MAC. BUILT

***Forty-seven MP's have now demanded of Prime Minister Macmillan that missile bases must be opposed outright.*—News item.**

THIS is the base that Mac. built.
This is the Thor
To fly from the base that Mac. built.

This is the site
To launch the Thor,
To fly from the base that Mac. built.

This is the right
To lend the site
To launch the Thor,
To fly from the base that Mac. built.

This is the fight
To end the right
To lend the site
To launch the Thor,
To fly from the base that Mac. built.

This is the Anglo-US pact,
That started the fight
To end the right
To lend the site
To launch the Thor,
To fly from the base that Mac. built.

This is the warhead to be stacked,
By terms of the Anglo-US pact,
That started the fight
To end the right
To lend the site
To launch the Thor,
To fly from the base that Mac. built.

This is the pledge by MP's backed,
To veto the warheads to be stacked,
By terms of the Anglo-US pact,
That started the fight
To end the right
To lend the site
To launch the Thor,
To fly from the base that Mac. built.

This is the suicidal act,
Condemned in the pledge by MP's backed,
To veto the warheads to be stacked,
By terms of the Anglo-US pact,
That started the fight
To end the right
To lend the site
To launch the Thor,
To fly from the base that Mac. built.

THIS is the now accomplished fact,
To many, a suicidal act,
Condemned in the pledge by MP's backed,
To veto the warheads to be stacked,
By terms of the Anglo-US pact,
That started the fight
To end the right
To lend the site
To launch the Thor,
To fly from the base that Mac. built.

SAGITTARIUS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Germany: The Missile Base Alarm

Bonn

On March 10, 40 leading citizens of Western Germany signed and published an appeal against "nuclear death" and simultaneously announced the launching of a campaign to prevent the nuclear armament of the West German forces and the storing or employment of nuclear arms in Germany. They will advocate the establishment of a "nuclear-free" zone in Central Europe, along the lines of the Rapacki Plan. Their opening announcement calls on the Bundestag and the Federal Government to ban the import of nuclear arms into Western Germany and appeals to the people of Western Germany to show their disapproval of present government arms policy.

The 40 names are largely familiar. They include the leading members of the Social Democratic Party, Dr. Gustav Heinemann—for years past the chief political protagonist of the neutralization of Germany between East and West—university professors, theologians, writers and members of the Evangelical Churches—all obviously inspired by the best possible motives. It at once became clear that a large section of the West German press will treat the campaign with sympathy, even if they do not support it unreservedly. Intellectual opinion, especially among scientists and theologians, is heavily weighted in its favor.

How will the people of Western Germany react to a campaign, appealing as this one does to the rational dread of the hydrogen bomb and the thought of unlimited slaughter, and the general desire to win for Germany some special position in the East-West conflict which would guarantee her against the total destruction which might envelop others? Three factors will have important bearing on the answer.

In the first place, the Social Democrats have already led one anti-war crusade. Three years ago they launched a campaign against West German rearmament in the Frankfurt St. Paul's Church. Brilliant speeches were made by Professors Gollwitzer and Weber of Muenster and Heidelberg Universities. It was a momentous occasion, for one was able to listen to Germans speaking from their hearts, which does not happen very often. But the campaign fizzled out in a bare three months for two reasons: the West Germans had not forgotten the brutal repression of the East German Revolution of June, 1953; and the Social Democrats, as they have repeatedly proved themselves in the last 12 years, were sadly inefficient organizers.

The second factor that will influence the outcome is the division of Germany. The original West German decision to rearm came about largely because the East Germans had already made a start—with a People's Police Force which approximated a standing army and which was duly transformed into one. But today there are solid arguments against carrying West German rearmament to the last logical, or illogical, conclusion. The basing of nuclear weapons in Western Germany may establish a NATO frontline which would become as immovable as the Maginot. For no matter how far nuclear weapons develop, there will always be an advantage to be gained from cutting the distance to the enemy's vitals (here one should remind oneself that the Maginot line was not planned solely as a line of static defense, but as a "ligne d'appui"—a redoubt from which the necessary advance could be made). Federal Defense Ministry experts have already reconnoitered advance posts in the Teuteburger Wald and the Sauerland, with the idea of a "nuclear front line" 80 miles east of the Rhine.

Here is a disturbing thought for the West Germans—although it may take more persuasive arguments to convince them than those advanced by the tongue-free but incoherent Social Democrats. Once nuclear weapons are solidly established in Western Germany, a solution of the German problem will only be possible if it is part of a global solution of East-West differences.

The third factor in the present situation is the need of the Western German people. Primarily it is one of impatience. The West Germans seem perfectly contented—given material success which is not interrupted—with a government which relies exclusively on the West to secure eventual reunification. A check to this material success, and the mood changes. There has just been such a check, even though it may turn out to be a slight one. Unemployment has now risen above last year's post-war low, steel production has dropped around 15 percent, order books are not as full as a year ago, large-scale industrial strikes threaten for the first time in three years. Behind all this is the uncertainty engendered by an American trade recession.

Clever management could canalize this impatience and uncertainty of mind into the single issue of the nuclear controversy. The chapters of the Evangelical Churches have just appealed to the church synod to reject all nuclear armaments for Germany. The Free Democratic press has exploded with its fears of radioactive contamination of Western Europe. Two villages near Karlsruhe have reiterated their determination not to allow the Federal nuclear-research project to be established on their ground. The letters-to-the-editor columns of many newspapers are swamped with views for and against nuclear armament.

All this should spell a big chance for the opponents of projection of the nuclear arms-race into the Central European theatre—if they take this chance.

TERENCE PRITTIE

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Superficial Aspect

What Makes the Mare Go?

THE MOST hopeless political comment ever uttered is, "They have learned nothing and forgotten nothing," a French pessimist's note on the restored Bourbons.

But when Herbert Hoover repeats word for word a speech he made in 1931; when the incumbent President repeats the former President's assurance that "prosperity is just around the corner"; and when the incoming president of the United States Chamber of Commerce echoes George F. Baer, the French comment becomes a most apt description of the restored Republicans in Washington.

Baer's unforgettable remark, made in the midst of a great coal strike in 1902, was, "The rights and interests of the laboring man will be protected and cared for —not by labor agitators, but by the Christian men to whom God in His infinite wisdom has given the control of the property interests of the country."

In 1958 William A. McDonnell, new head of the US Chamber of Commerce, says that the recession will be overcome "primarily in the market place rather than on Capitol Hill." That is to say, we shall all be "protected and cared for" by "the Christian men" who have control of property. Mr. McDonnell has neither forgotten Baer, nor learned wherein Baer was a jackass; Mr. Hoover has not forgotten his speech of 1931, and neither he nor Mr. Eisenhower has learned wherein that speech was ridiculous.

By the Executive branch at this moment the "trickle-down" theory of prosperity is believed as firmly as it was believed by Coolidge, who led us into the panic of 1929, and by Benjamin Harrison, who led us into the panic of 1893, and by Grant, who led us into the panic of 1873. None questioned the wisdom and virtue of "the Christian men." And in each case "the Christian men" played hell with prosperity.

They have learned nothing and forgotten nothing. Eisenhower has the gall to declare that the present trouble centers in the durable-goods industry, so if we rescue heavy industry, all will be well. "What is good for General Motors is good for the United States." Assure Mr. Plutocrat continuance of his dividends and Mr. Plutocrat will "protect and care for" Draggle-Tail Bill, for is not Mr. Plutocrat a Christian man to whom God in His wisdom has given property?

No attention is paid the opposing theory, that all too often Mr. Plutocrat is not a Christian man but a subspecies *(Homo sus)* of the *Suidae,* whose ruling passion is determination to get all four feet into the swill-trough. Yet Draggle-Tail Bill tends to entertain that theory when five million of his kind are jobless.

Nobody in the Administration seems capable of mastering the simple idea that what has pinched off prosperity is the agonizing cost of living that has taken more and more of us out of the market for durable goods. Nobody in Washington seems able to imagine that bringing prices down would send buying up. The price structure is too holy to be touched.

For to lay unhallowed hands on prices might precipitate what is the ultimate horror in the eyes of those who have learned nothing and forgotten nothing. This apocalyptic doom has been described, with immense financial success, in a piece of fiction turned out by some Little Sister of the Rich under the title of "Atlas Shrugged." Atlas is another name for Baer's Christian men to whom God has given everything, including care of the rest of us. Atlas, in the story, got tired of our ingratitude and shrugged, whereupon we all pitched headlong into ruin.

Baer, starting life as a printer, could certainly read, and as a college man he could presumably read a book; therefore he might have winced at the literary style of this novel, but he would have approved its philosophy. Hoover and Eisenhower ought to approve, and their surrounding tycoons do approve as is shown by the way the book has sold.

Yet all this approval does not establish any relation between the fiction and the fact. The country is obviously on the descent to Avernus, but a great many Americans doubt that it is because Atlas shrugged. They incline to the opinion that Atlas has once more stumbled over his own feet and fallen flat on his silly face.

FOR WHEN it comes to making things, whether swords and spears or plowshares and pruning-hooks, Atlas is good, Atlas indeed is matchless. But when it comes to law-giving, which is to say, dealing with the minds and spirits of men, Atlas is out of his class and makes a godawful mess of it, because the acquisitive instinct, a powerful and valuable stimulant in the realm of economics, is rank poison in the realm of the arts, including the art of government.

Some of us superficial observers guessed this as early as 1953, when the first Eisenhower Cabinet turned out to be composed of nine millionaires and a plumber; for we knew, *pace* the proverb, that money alone does not make the mare go.

GERALD W. JOHNSON

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Money and the Art of Irony

by REED WHITTEMORE

IN THIS COUNTRY it has come to pass that a "profit is almost without honor." At least the editor of the financial weekly *Barron's* said so in a recent editorial. *Barron's* is easily the most thoughtful of the business magazines; it is also the best written. Its editor has an admirable talent for stating explicitly the general complaints of the Street.

The editorial went on to say that "according to many a dreary survey, the man in the street" (the ungrateful "Draggle-Tail Bill," for example, see p. 10) entertains "exaggerated and critical notions regarding profit margins"; that Washington and labor similarly think of profits as something to take a club to; and that none of these antagonists of sound business ever seems to remember that profits "happen to be *the* moving force behind business activity" (my italics). The editorial concluded that "the US will regain its prosperity only as it restores the conditions under which the risk-taker can thrive."

I like this editorial, although I disagree with it, because it expresses with no namby-pamby the basic Republican premise: *the* moving force is profits. Elsewhere in the same issue an advertisement for *Barron's* softens the premise a bit, but not enough to win over the poor befuddled man in the street; in a tantalizing little skit the president of a large corporation asks his three department heads, "What keeps this corporation going?" The department heads reply, in order: product sales, human beings and communications. The president agrees with them but then says that he'd like "to throw still one more answer into the hopper." Then:

> The three execs watched his face.
> "Money," he said softly.

I like the "softly" particularly. It is the president's softness that makes the department heads feel like fools. It is cutting, ironic: it tells them in effect that the president really doesn't think their answers worth a nickel (though he has said he does). He knows, because he is wise beyond all wisdom, that the great machine of industry, composed of many gears and many drive shafts, is driven from up above by merely one motor: money. *The* moving force is profits.

So here we are. At rock bottom. The Republicans, together with an indeterminable number of Democrats, walk over to one side of the room (or bottom), and a scraggly group of Democratic men in the street, government officials and teachers walk over to the other. The two groups stare at each other, shout words and editorials at each other, and make threatening gestures. But not a single thoughtful remark from either group ever reaches all the way across the room (or bottom). For now, to befuddle all previous metaphors, we can observe a vast abyss or chasm opening up between the two groups.

The apparent depth or width of this chasm is perhaps best indicated by the wealth of ironic banter produced on both sides. Most businessmen pride themselves on being able to face the hard facts of economic life (or just life); and to demonstrate this ability they are constantly to be found looking ironic and speaking ironically at the expense of ideals and idealists. Similarly most of the Democratic other ranks across the chasm, although they may think of themselves as hard-facts personages too, like to be ironic at the expense of those who think that all facts are ultimately money facts. Money thus is a central factor in the ironies of both sides.

Now I like irony, just as I like money. I take infinite delight in trying to crush a student or a Republican (usually the same thing) with this ancient rhetorical device; and if someone were to come to me and say that henceforward I must be straightforward I would probably sit down on some salt beach with Timon of Athens and bawl. Thus I have nothing but respect for the mythical corporation president above who spoke "softly." But as an old ironist and student of irony I must report that the president didn't convince me with his cleverness. He was ironic all right, but I found it ironic that he was ironic; that is, I found it ironic that he should have been so solidly persuaded of the omnipotence of money as to be ironic at the expense of the other components of industry which (or who) make that money for him. His irony therefore worked against him with me.

His trouble—if I may be so bold as to analyze him—is that he is rich. How wonderfully simple. He is well educated. He has a fine, sharp, ironic intelligence. He is even (perhaps) generous to a fault in his dealings with the poor of his community. But his condition of affluence and power, while it is hardly one for which he should be pitied, is one of the poorest conditions known to man from which actively to practice irony, to use it as a rhetorical weapon. The weapon will almost surely

---

REED WHITTEMORE, *a frequent contributor to this journal, teaches literature at Carleton College in Northfield, Minnesota.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

turn against him before he is through, making him the attacked rather than the attacker.

On the other hand poverty, or any other unfortunate human condition, is a condition of strength for the art of irony. The poor man, the mistreated man, the ill-fated man is marvelously equipped by his condition, even if not by his intelligence, to be ironic. He has all the evidence of the world's ironies in his prostrate self; he is an animate, breathing document attesting to the disparity between what the world is and what it ought to be.

BUT woe to the ironist who finds himself most sinned against when he isn't. An example of this appeared in the papers recently. A New Yorker who had failed to pay more than a hundred parking tickets (and had thereby established a new record for the course) was fined $6,000. He apparently found it ironic that he should be fined $6,000 for some crumby old parking tickets, for he paid his fine and then said, "I am a victim of circumstances." Here it is ironic to practically everybody *except* this man that he should have gone strutting about like King Lear when he was not King Lear. Similarly it is almost sure to be ironic—to the other ranks across the chasm—for any rich man ever to think of himself as in any way any sort of economic victim. Remember Charles Wilson's wholly serious remark, when he first came to Washington, about the sacrifice he was making. It is out of the same barrel as the remark by the parking-ticket man. So also, though more subtly, is this remark, already quoted, in the *Barron's* editorial:

> The US will regain its prosperity only as it restores the conditions under which the risk-taker can thrive.

Risk-taker! Who is the risk-taker? That corporation president who spoke softly (ironically) about money? No! Not really!

But of course he *is* a risk-taker. And in the eyes of businessmen he is a risk-taker supreme. It is only across the chasm that the risks he takes don't look like much. It is only there that one can hear guffaws bubbling up from proletarian stomachs. This brings up another point about irony which, though obvious, needs to be put down in black and white: a condition or a position is only ironic when there is someone in another and alien condition or position to observe it. The chasm again. It is ironic to a poor man, not a rich man, that Charles Wilson should have spoken as he did. It is ironic to those of us who have *not* received and failed to pay a hundred parking tickets that the parking-ticket man should have thought himself a victim.

The word "alien" is thoroughly appropriate here. To perceive the irony in somebody else's actions or words, it helps if one is not of that person's native "country," not of the peculiar moral, economic, social or intellectual climate. Thus, in Edmund Wilson's book, *The Scrolls from the Dead Sea,* Wilson describes Pliny's point of view toward the Essenes as simultaneously alien and ironic, when Pliny describes the Essenes as follows:

> A solitary people, and extraordinary beyond all others in the whole world, who live without women and have renounced all commerce with Venus, and also without money, having the palms for their only companions. They constantly renew themselves from the steady stream of refugees that resort to them in large numbers, men who, weary of life, have been driven by the vicissitudes of fortune to adopt their manner of living. Thus through thousands of centuries, incredible though it may seem, a people has perpetuated itself in which no one is ever born.

A fine passage, I think. The irony is not obtrusive, but it is there, particularly in the passage about renouncing Venus and having only palms for companions. Furthermore, it is mixed in with Pliny's apparently genuine wonder and astonishment that such a people should be walking about on the face of the earth. The irony and wonder go together; they are inseparable; Pliny feels no slightest affinity for the Essene's position; he doesn't profess to understand them. His is the basic alien condition which makes communion with, and sympathy for, persons across the chasm nearly impossible.

Pliny does not appear to be a man trying *positively* to deepen the chasm between himself and the Essenes. It is simply there and he is reckoning with it. But as we all know the ironist is not always so innocent. The practice of irony is very frequently connected with some tick in the practitioner's *id* (or whatever) which makes it important to him personally to assert his separateness from the person or condition being ironized. And he thereupon proceeds to do what he can to widen the chasm between him and them, at their expense.

In place of wonder, then, we find simply contempt. Not that Pliny is devoid of contempt. But his contempt has not yet quite won out over wonder. He certainly feels superior to the Essenes, but he is also a bit unsure of himself amongst them—unlike the editor of *Barron's* in the following already quoted passage:

> According to many a dreary survey the man in the street [entertains] exaggerated and critical notions regarding profit margins.

The critical word is of course "dreary." Those surveys—ugh!—we have seen them all already, known them all. They are impossible. They infallibly prove that the world (the man in the street) is against us—but do we care? No, we are incorruptible. We know better than the world does.

Similarly the *Barron's* editor's remark that profits "*happen to be* the moving force behind business activity" is designed to clear the country of all contemptible characters (and presumably there are a lot of them—the dreary surveys prove it) who haven't the brains to see the plainest of truths. Anyone who happens *not* to think

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that profits are the moving force is, like the last one in the water, a donkey.

This irony—the irony of contempt, the irony of the superior being—is obviously not an argumentative device at all. He who uses it assumes at the outset that his position is the only position; and having assumed this, he is ironic not because he thinks irony will help him against his opponents—he does not need help—but because he hopes his irony will be appreciated by those who already agree with him.

Barron's is, of course, not alone in practicing this chasm-making art. Quite the opposite. *Barron's* is a magazine for the Wall Street fraternity, but there are dozens of other magazines which also have their fraternities and also, have their own exclusive ironic rituals. On the other side of the money chasm, for example, it is hard to find a periodical which is not in one way or another dedicated to the principle of exclusion I have outlined above. From the *Daily Worker,* which was surely a masterpiece of rhetorical clubbishness, to the *Democratic Digest,* which was not much better, we can find the great art of rhetoric turned over lock, stock and barrel to just the kind of rhetorician that made Plato despise rhetoricians—the kind that wants to be witty, forceful, eloquent and ever so charming, but doesn't want to be argued with. Indeed the logic, if it can be called logic, of such rhetoricians is like something out of Lewis Carroll, and applied to periodicals it runs as follows: (1) any responsible periodical in our society should be dedicated to discovering truth; (2) to achieve this high end it is necessary to discover an audience (preferably large) which has already discovered some truth or other; and (3) any responsible periodical must keep reminding its audience what the audience's truth is. Thus, ultimately such rhetoricians practice with words what our Republican economists like to practice with money: the doctrine of (enlightened?) self-interest. This doctrine produces the irony of the superior being, the irony of exclusion.

I HAVE already mentioned the irony of the weak, and since such irony might be imagined to proceed from a wholly different doctrine, some examples of it from current periodicals should be of value here. Unfortunately the examples—at least good examples—are not easy to find, and their rarity is significant. Hardly a publication is now alive which makes any earnest gesture toward humility, Esseneness or whatever one wishes to call what we have not got. As a result there appear to be no journalists rushing to be seriously, consciously ironic at their own or their cause's expense. This is not to say that self-criticism is totally absent, but that what is offered is not meant, and therefore might as well be absent.

Here is an instance of unmeant weakness from the very issue of *Barron's* I have been maligning. In a long piece on the recent high profits of the soft-drink companies the author attributes some of the companies' success to their "renewed missionary zeal in opening up foreign markets all over the globe." I assume that is a little crumb of ironic wit (who would not be a missionary when profits are up to $7 a share? etc.). But the irony, such as it is, is at the expense of the soft-drink people. In a different context (and a different magazine) the very same sentence could readily be used as a device to stir hearts against the money-grubbing capitalists. Therefore, if one were to take the author seriously, one might reasonably regard him as at least a part-time defector from the philosophy that *the* moving force is profits.

Clearly one *can't* take the irony seriously. It is just a small joke. It is not a gesture across the chasm at all, but a little cynicism for the benefit of those on the right side. I am reminded of the ironies that are constantly passed around by performers in two of our illustrious professions, the medical profession and the teaching profession. Since the representatives of both are highly educated men it might be expected that they would manage to act according to their convictions (*i.e.*, their ironies) more readily or more frequently than the lower animal orders. But though I have heard a great many doctors, and some very high paid ones at that, speak much more ironically of their fees than the *Barron's* man spoke of the profits of Canada Dry, I have not heard of any organization of doctors dedicated to lowering doctor's fees. The irony of the professors is the same, but much sadder, more poignant; they speak ironically against the money-grubbers too, but most earnestly (and with vast ineffect) try to catch up with them. Both the doctor and the professor want the rewards, the way a squirrel wants nuts. And between the doctor squirrel who gathers unto himself 40,000 of the aforesaid nuts a year, and the professor squirrel who gathers unto himself 6,000, the basic money gap stubbornly remains despite any apparent ironic concessions from either side.

These unmeant ironies are with us by the carload, and they are perhaps the best examples of the ineffectiveness of irony in a society in which almost everybody who can write is (relatively) well off. So long as it costs nothing to be ironic, so long as there is no mob in the streets ready to start throwing things when a corporation president (subbing for the Queen) says, "Let 'em eat cake," just so long will the irony of weakness be weak. I suppose, therefore, that I should pray that it remain weak, not merely because I do not want mobs in the streets, but also because I can see in my crystal ball another essay related to this one. Its title would be, *The Cuteness of Well-Being.*

An essay? Nay, a book.

But somebody will have to write it. It would involve more study than I could stomach of cocktail-napkin jokes, get-well cards and TV comedians' patter.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Case for Disengagement—III

How To Start Disengagement

by DENIS HEALEY

STRIPPED to its essentials, disengagement means drawing the armed forces of NATO and the Soviet Union apart from one another and establishing joint control over the area in between. It implies substituting cooperation for conflict along the sensitive frontier of the Cold War. Now that the thermonuclear stalemate offers no alternative to co-existence but no-existence, both sides can expect to benefit by disengagement, since it provides the possibility of peaceful change in areas of great instability, and reduces the danger of an unnecessary world war should that instability nevertheless erupt in violent explosion. Above all it represents a first step toward ending the futile, back-breaking and perilous weapons race by establishing a pilot project in the techniques of arms limitation and control.

I have outlined a concrete plan for disengagement in Central Europe. What immediately emerges from study of such a plan is that it involves a solution of some of the most intractable political problems of the postwar world. And though these problems become infinitely easier to handle in the context of military disengagement, even with good will on both sides the process is likely to take years rather than months. Moreover, some of the purely military problems of disengagement—the problem of sanctions against aggression, for example—require the West to adapt its strategic doctrine and organization to the revolution in military technology. This adaptation is only just beginning, although it is just as necessary if the West is to produce a military posture suitable for protecting the existing status quo in Europe.

The idea of military disengagement has figured in the diplomatic proposals of both West and East more than once in the last few years, but largely as an element in the propaganda battle. Now for the first time both sides are beginning to consider it seriously, and are examining the risks and opportunities it offers with a caution they did not display before. Under careful scrutiny disengagement is seen to involve an unprecedented revolution in the political attitudes of both the West and Russia, since it assumes a form of positive cooperation going far beyond the negative principles of co-existence as defined in Communist doctrine. And some Western statesmen who are wont to see the Cold War as a religious crusade are just as reluctant as the Communists to envisage lasting cooperation.

For all these reasons it is clear that at present neither side is likely to commit itself in advance to a thoroughgoing program of disengagement such as I have proposed. Disengagement can take place only by stages, each of which is complete in itself, in the sense that it is fully susceptible of control by both sides, and that either side can halt the process of disengagement there if it feels it would be too dangerous to go further. Moreover, my own impression after intensive discussion with representatives of all the countries concerned is that, whatever they may say for propaganda purposes, none of the great powers will commit itself in practice at the moment either to the political neutralization of the Central European states or to the total evacuation of foreign forces. Thus the first stage in disengagement must be restricted to the reduction, not evacuation, of forces in the area concerned, leaving the existing structure of alliances unimpaired.

In my opinion, the main Western aim at the forthcoming Summit Conference should be to reach agreement with the Russians on a proposal for the limitation of armaments in Central Europe—this is by far the most important issue on which the bargaining positions of the two sides are sufficiently close together to justify a moderate optimism. A few years ago Sir Anthony Eden made several proposals for a thinning out of troops in Central Europe, and it is often forgotten that he did so with the support of Mr. Dulles. The United Nations Disarmament Subcommittee last year came close to agreement on such a proposal: the main stumbling block was Western insistence on making a package deal which included agreement on several unrelated issues. There are signs that, having sacked Mr. Stassen, the US Administration may at last adopt his views on the unwisdom of seeking package deals: indeed the Disarmament Subcommittee of the US Senate has already asked the government to study plans for reduction of troops in Central Europe. Finally, the Communist governments have already tabled a proposal for arms limitation in Central Europe in the so-called Rapacki Plan.

The Rapacki Plan, as it stands, contains provisions

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which are so obviously weighted against the West that it can be considered only as an extreme position from which bargaining can begin. It proposes a total ban on the stationing or use of atomic weapons in Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, without any limitation on conventional forces in the same area. But the West cannot hope to counter the immense preponderance of Russian forces in Central Europe without the use of atomic weapons—although it is conceivable that NATO's atomic weapons might be stationed outside Germany in peacetime, without great military disadvantage. Moreover, the American and British NATO forces are being reorganized and reduced in number with a view to fighting with atomic weapons. If they were forbidden the use of these weapons, it is doubtful whether they would stay on the continent at all.

In the second place, it is technically impossible to limit any disarmament plan to nuclear weapons alone. Much of the nuclear ammunition now available is small enough to be hidden as easily as footballs, and can be fired from conventional artillery or carried in small aircraft. Thus the inspection of a ban on nuclear ammunition would involve the right to examine every square yard of the territory concerned. Even so, it would be impossible to prevent clandestine imports of nuclear ammunition in an emergency. If the ban were extended to all possible means of delivering nuclear weapons, it would cover almost all weapons except the rifle, *i.e.* would involve almost total demilitarization.

Finally, the Rapacki Plan involves discrimination against Western Germany as the only member of NATO to be forbidden the possession of nuclear weapons, although she gets nothing in return by way of progress toward reunification. On the contrary, insofar as the fear of German nuclear weapons provides Russia with an incentive to consider disengagement in its wider sense, the Rapacki Plan would enormously weaken the West's bargaining position on German reunification. Moreover, by accepting formal discrimination against Germany, NATO would create resentment against itself which might in time lead the Federal Republic to make its own approach to Russia.

On the other hand, apart from limiting disarmament to nuclear weapons alone, the Rapacki Plan includes several dramatic concessions to the Western position. It is the first proposal ever made in which the Russians offer to equate Eastern Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia on their side of the Iron Curtain with Western Germany alone on the NATO side. In other words, they accept as an area for joint control very much the same countries as Mr. Gaitskell has proposed for his disengagement plan. In the second place they offer detailed provisions for physical supervision of the arms limitation through ground control teams—though the powers and location of such teams remain subject to negotiation.

In his first two articles DENIS HEALEY *set forth why he believes that disengagement is "by far the most hopeful issue on which to concentrate at Summit talks" and what, specifically, he sees as a realistic plan: "Russia must evacuate at least Eastern Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia; the West must remain in at least the Low Countries and France." The Soviet Union, Mr. Healey conceded, is unlikely to accept such a plan. Soviet troops would evacuate Eastern Europe only if gradual evolution—rather than anti-Soviet revolution—were assured in the satellites. But, he argued, "once negotiations begin between Russia and the West on the general principle of disengagement, the evolution in Eastern Europe will steadily accelerate, and the dangers of a violent explosion will diminish."*

Here, in his concluding article, Mr. Healey discusses how and when a start can be made in a process which "would take years, not months, to carry out."

Finally, they have tried to meet Western reluctance to have formal diplomatic contact with the Pankow regime in East Germany by agreeing that the agreement should be established through unilateral declarations by the governments concerned instead of by a common treaty.

Not the least important aspect of the Rapacki Plan is that it originated last October in Warsaw without Soviet prompting or support. It represents the first important international initiative by a Communist regime which is trying to assert its independence within the Soviet bloc. Since Russia took up the Rapacki Plan, it has been further developed in close cooperation with the other Communist states concerned. But there is overwhelming evidence to show that the Polish Government at least would welcome constructive criticism by the West, and hopes for counter-proposals which will include a limitation on conventional forces in the area.

It is now urgent that the Western governments should agree on concrete counter-proposals to the Rapacki Plan which would aim at a balanced limitation of both conventional and nuclear armaments in the area. Such a proposal would involve no more inspection than the Rapacki Plan itself—indeed it is the only way of making such inspection effective. The West could only gain by the establishment of arms limitation and control in Central Europe. The Russians, too, would have every reason to accept it, if, as they say, they have no intention of using force to change the present status quo.

The main argument against such a plan—particularly in Western Germany—is that by reducing the dangers of the present division of Europe it reduces the incentive to end it. There is, of course, some truth in this argument. But I believe that the establishment of arms limitation and control in Central Europe would do far more to encourage the forces on both sides which want

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

peaceful change than to strengthen those who oppose it. The relaxation of tension would encourage the peace camp in Russia itself as well as in the satellite states. And those in Eastern Europe who saw it as the first step toward complete disengagement would be given hope where at present Western policy offers them only despair. The danger of a surprise attack by Russia's overwhelming ground forces, which is NATO's main military preoccupation at present, would be enormously reduced, if not eliminated for good. Moreover, once the principle of a balanced reduction in both nuclear and conventional forces were accepted, it would be easy for the West to mobilize world support for massive reductions in Russia's European armies.

Inspection in itself would not be a major technical problem in Central Europe, since both sides are able to inspect one another's forces there in great detail already through normal intelligence operations. What would be new if joint inspection were agreed is that the strength of the opposing forces could be published with international authority. For this reason it would be desirable to involve the United Nations directly in the agreement, and to include neutral representatives in the inspection teams. This would still further increase the political disadvantages and military difficulties of mounting a surprise attack.

In my opinion, the change in the whole climate of the Cold War if such a scheme were put into practice would in itself encourage rapid further progress toward complete disengagement. And it would be possible in any case to set a time limit for the first stage—to insist that if further progress were not made within, say, five years, each side was free to denounce the agreement and return to the status quo ante. It is possible that such a time limit might be necessary to persuade the West German Government to accept a first stage in arms limitation without any progress toward reunification.

In any case, it will be easier to take the first step this year than at any time in the future. At the moment the power of decision lies overwhelmingly with the three nuclear great powers. As nuclear weapons become more widespread, either within the Western alliance or outside, it will become ever more difficult to coordinate a collective policy of disarmament and disengagement.

In my first article, I described the way in which the logic on thermonuclear strategy threatens to disintegrate the Atlantic alliance. The present failure of the leading Western powers to offer any political hope for an end to the Cold War is equally damaging to allied unity. NATO will survive only if it adapts itself to the tremendous changes which have taken place in the world since it was founded nine years ago. But if it fails to adapt itself collectively to these changes it cannot prevent its members from trying to adapt themselves individually. A policy of disengagement is not an alternative to the Western alliance—it is the only way of keeping the Western alliance effective. NATO will have a vital role even after the whole program of disengagement has been completed, as the indispensable basis to ensure that the agreement is respected.

At this final stage in the argument, I find that supporters of official Western policy will concede that disengagement is in the Western interest, and start arguing that for this reason Russia will never accept it—and therefore we should not put it forward. I have tried to show that in fact disengagement is in the interests of humanity as a whole—the Russians have no less an interest in it than the West, because they live on the same planet. But even if the Russians do not accept it today, that is no reason why the West should not propose it. After all, we know for certain that Russia will not accept NATO's present policy for a European settlement. Moreover, she can reject NATO's present policy without suffering any harm in world opinion, since no one, even in the West, believes that our present demands are reasonable. If, on the other hand, the Kremlin rejected proposals for disengagement, it would lose heavily in support—among the peoples of the Communist states no less than in the West and the uncommitted world.

Even disengagement is not an end in itself. It must be seen only as part of a far wider development. Indeed it is doubtful whether it would be possible to preserve a system of disengagement in Central Europe for long unless progress were made in other fields and other areas toward cooperation between the West and the Communist world. It would be difficult for the two camps to cooperate in Europe if they were in bitter conflict in the Middle East and the West Pacific. Moreover, the countries of Central Europe would be unlikely to accept special limitations on their military and diplomatic freedom for long unless they saw hope of other countries accepting similar limitations. Thus disengagement must ultimately lead to world disarmament, involving America and Russia themselves as well as countries in between.

It may seem pathetically over-optimistic even to hint at such a thing today. Yet there is truth in the trite old platitude that in the long run world government is the only alternative to race suicide. The discovery of atomic power is a milestone in the history of mankind beside which even the discovery of fire assumes minor importance. For mankind has achieved the power to destroy itself at a time when its social organization as an anarchy of sovereign states accepts war as a normal means of producing change. Unless mankind can reorganize its international relations so as to eliminate war as an instrument of policy, the discovery of atomic power may prove to be not a milestone, but a gravestone. Disengagement offers hope of beginning this reorganization in the area where it is most urgent and necessary. If there is a better hope in any alternative, those who reject disengagement have a clear duty to say what it is.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BOOKS & COMMENT

Between Fact and Fable

by Irving Howe

AS A MAN reflecting upon the life of our time, Albert Camus is an enormously sympathetic figure. His mind lacks the compulsive power of a Malraux or the wild fecundity of a Sartre, but it seldom becomes infatuated, in the manner of both Malraux and Sartre, with its own dilemmas and agilities. In defense of the values by which he tries to live, Camus can be properly intransigent; but he is also ready to bend—to yield with grace—before the claims of the body, the needs of feeling, the waywardness of a humane impulse. This readiness, it is true, shows to least advantage in the recent short novel, *The Fall*, where one finds a Jansenist Camus, a "judge-penitent" lacerating himself beyond the limits of humility. In the long run, it may be, *The Fall* will matter in Camus' development primarily as a counter-thrust to his own predispositions, a check to one of his main weaknesses as a writer: the temptation to reduce humanism to a literary strategy.

Exile and the Kingdom, by Albert Camus, translated by Justin O'Brien (Knopf; $3.50).

One feels about Camus that, like Silone, he is a writer to be trusted to the very end. Because he is a man like all other men, he is also a writer who may mislead; but because he has looked at the face of power and turned away, he will not violate his readers with ideological or spiritual trickery. By the essential modesty of his manner, in which gravity and diffidence quietly blend, Camus validates the idea of friendship between the man who writes and the other man, unknown to the writer, who reads his work.

Yet these qualities are not unambiguous advantages to Camus when he turns to writing fiction. Almost all of his novels and stories are works of interest, but few are totally successful; Camus has not yet given himself irrevocably to the powers of art, he has not yet taken the final step that would bring him from the realm of reflection to the realm of imagination.

The essential difficulty of Camus as a writer of fiction is not so different, however, from his difficulty as a thinker: it is the problem of embodiment, of transforming sentiments into dramatic images or precise ideas. To some extent, I would imagine, this reflects the dilemma of those post-Resistance intellectuals in France who refused to surrender themselves to any total ideology yet felt a need for some principle by which to guide their public life. Their earlier hopes dissipated, they soon began to fall back upon sentiments of fraternity, sentiments without which little else can be worth while but which in themselves cannot lead to concrete realizations in either life or art. Perhaps that is why Camus' reflections tend to go soft and vague, and why his fiction seems thin-blooded, abstract and willed.

Exile and the Kingdom, a collection of six stories, illustrates still another difficulty in Camus' gradual effort to transform himself from a moral philosopher into a writer of fiction. Except for the one or two first-rate stories in the book, Camus still seems torn between the impulse to offer testimony (which means, to reduce his fiction to mere examples) and the impulse to tell stories and create characters. There is something attractive in Camus' resistance to the role of novelist, his feeling, as it were, that really there are more important things for grown-up men to do; but at any given point, as one is actually reading his stories, this usually comes through as little more than a lack of creative energy.

Let me put the matter in another way. Camus has always had a weakness for allegory, a mode of fiction with an honorable past but dubious future. Allegory demands as its premise a commonly-accepted set of moral assumptions; from these it moves toward a kind of shadow-play of actions corresponding to and illuminating the initial assumptions. It is a mode that encourages writers to reveal an acknowledged public truth, but not to discover a variety of private truths. A writer like Hawthorne may embroider ambiguities upon an allegorical frame, but the primary moral assumptions of Christianity are still there, accepted in the story for the sake of the story, if not for their own sake. In Camus' work, however, these primary Christian assumptions are no longer present, except perhaps as a problem; they have been replaced by an essential and pervasive ambiguity, so that the allegorical structure Camus is always beginning to raise is also tending always to fall apart.

The result is a curious mixture of the threadbare and the obscure—the threadbare because one quickly detects in most of Camus' stories the nagging pressure of the point he is trying to make, and the obscure because it is often difficult to discover the implications—that is, the moral context—of this point.

CONSIDER, for example, the story "The Growing Stone." A French engineer in the Brazilian hinterland meets with a Negro sailor who has vowed, in gratitude for having been saved from drowning, to carry a 100 pound stone on his head in a festival for St. George. On the day of the festival, the Negro, wearied from a night of native dancing, sweats and strains to fulfill his vow. When he collapses under the weight of the stone, the Frenchman, stirred by the sacred simplicity of the Negro and by the exotic fervor of the locale, seizes the rock himself and satisfies the Negro's obligation. The story then ends with a moment of brotherhood between the Negroes and the French engineer.

Despite the heavy underbrush of fervid description that Camus has placed along the way, it soon becomes clear that this story drives insistently toward a point; in fact, the point of the story soon becomes more visible than its action. But if one then tries to relate Camus' allegorical intention to a system of meanings beyond the frame of the story, a system which, like Christianity for traditional allegory, might give this intention some larger scope and rever-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

beration—if one does this, as Camus' method invites one to do, there is nothing at hand, nothing beyond a vague sentiment of fraternity. As a sign of Camus' desire the allegorical intention of the story is quite moving, but neither the story as a piece of fiction nor the possible ramifications of the allegorical sub-structure are finally realized.

By contrast, however, there are a few stories in which Camus seems really on the way toward working out a fictional approach of his own. These are set in Algeria, a locale that rouses Camus to a particular intensity of response; they have as their dramatic subject the tragedy of misunderstanding and the horror of struggle between European and Arab; and whatever meanings one may read out of them, these stories exist, first of all, as imagined entities credible in their own right.

"The Renegade" is a powerful monologue spoken by a French priest who has been tortured by a desert tribe and has learned to worship his tormentors. Anyone susceptible to sheer performance must respond to the surface of this story; but it is too clearly a *tour de force,* an effort by Camus to write something enormous and uncharacteristic. "The Adulterous Woman" is a sketch of the wife of a French trader, who in a south Algerian town unexpectedly finds herself hating the whole routine of petty-bourgeois existence which to her *is* French life and responding with a sense of cleansed excitement to the bareness of the desert, the sight of a nomad Arab camp made up of "a few men who had been ceaselessly trudging, possessing nothing but serving no one, poverty-stricken but free lords of a strange kingdom." Her moment of release is the Frenchwoman's sole adultery, but in conveying the starkness of place which allows her to realize that her life has been a wretched exile, Camus makes it an act of deep consequence.

Most impressive of all is "The Guest," which in a brilliantly-managed action portrays the tangle of hatreds that trap a decent Frenchman in Algeria and leave him estranged from both French and Arabs. In this story, which reminds one of Hemingway at his early best, Camus has enclosed all of his meanings within the action itself, so that nothing remains for him to say, nothing for him to remember from his other self as moralist. This is the way of art: sharp, concrete, self-contained. Here at last one feels no need to complain, in the words of Poe, "that if allegory ever establishes a fact, it is by dint of overturning a fiction."

With your help... The Mentally Ill Can Come Back

Give! Mental Health Campaign

Poetry and the State of Man

by Victor Lange

NO MATTER what one's view or one's taste towards modern German literature may be, Mr. Heller speaks in this collection of nine essays intelligently and persuasively of its chief figures. Few recent studies—Michael Hamburger's *Reason and Energy* is one of them—convey a conviction of importance with such an ample command of detail and context, and with such ease. That is, certainly, no small merit in a book which deals with some of the most formidable minds of the German tradition — Goethe, Burckhardt, Nietzsche, Rilke, Spengler, Kafka and Karl Kraus —and which spurns the cliches of literary history in favor of independent critical judgment.

The Disinherited Mind, by Erich Heller (Farar, Strauss & Cudahy; $3.75).

It is for good reasons that again and again, Mr. Heller's arguments return to Goethe; in him he recognizes a mind still in firm command of that interdependence of life and "idea" which, in the later Germans, becomes irreconcilably broken. In Goethe's view of science, of which we here receive an unusually lucid account, faith in the "meaning" or coherence, of empirical reality was still a central tenet, and for the poet, philosophy and poetry were equally aspects of the one cardinal preoccupation with order. If Mr. Heller admires Goethe enormously, it is because for him Goethe was "the last great poet who lived and worked in a continual effort to save the life of poetry *and* the poetry of life"—the last great poet, that is to say, who was engaged "in a campaign for maintaining the balance of power between analytical reason and creative imagination, between the 'merely concrete' and the 'idea'." But he could also (and this is the foundation of Goethe's battle against Newton) rest his ethical as well as his scientific convictions on a faith "in a perfect correspondence between the inner nature of man and the structure of external reality, between the soul and the world." But in spite of these large and sometimes overly bland judgments, Mr. Heller is not a sentimental admirer; in his second essay he examines certain limitations and defects in Goethe's sensibility. He misses in him, above all, a geniune sense of evil and sin, and in *Iphigenia* and *Faust* he recognizes the work of an intensely lyrical poet who yet failed in each case to argue effectively the reality of a certain noble vision of truth, because he would not admit in the objective world a kind and degree of evil sufficient to offer genuine resistance to the realization of that vision.

This is as much as to say that Goethe would not face the tragic nature of life and that, philosophically speaking, some of his finest works offer what Irving Babbitt described as only "sham solutions." Even in his life, Mr. Heller argues, Goethe tended to avoid the martyrdom of a mind such as Hoelderlin, who was more uncompromisingly aware of the incompatability of his vision of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

truth with an age of "unnaturalness," (that is, an age either of excessive rationalism or of excessive passion). *Faust* itself seems to end not only a paradox but in a plain contradition, in

> . . . the inevitable contradiction of the undedicated mind and heart. In Faust's world there are no real loyalties to be realized and no real commitments to be broken.

In a measure this Faustian dilemma was Goethe's own, for

> . . . such was the nature of his genius and the character of his age that the spirit could only live at the expense of life, and life only at the expense of the spirit.

Yet, Mr. Heller insists, it is altogether the wholeness of Goethe's classical vision of man and of culture that gives him the exemplary position in modern European history.

In another essay we contemplate that vision again, now from the agonized perspective of Nietzsche's situation at the end of the 19th Century, when the Goethean foundations of a concrete and non-speculative belief in the unity of religious, aesthetic and moral perceptions were disastrously shaken. For Nietzsche, like Goethe, was preoccupied, to use his own terms, not primarily with the question of certainty, as with the question of values, and this Mr. Heller means when he returns again and again to the issue of belief, in an age that is no longer committed to any sort of faith in the essential integrity of life. Nietzsche, who thought of Goethe as the "convinced realist in the midst of an unrealistic age," a mind who,

> . . . having attained to real freedom, lives at the very center of all things with a joyful and confident acceptance of fate, lives in the faith that only the particular in its separateness is objectionable, and that in the wholeness of life everything is affirmed in its holiness.

Nietzsche, nevertheless, in his immense despair at the doom of European culture, ultimately disavowed Goethe and in this Mr. Heller, perhaps rightly, sees an attitude of tragic spiritual impatience.

It is in the essay "Rilke and Nietzsche" that the relationship between thought, belief, and poetry—which in Goethe's work was still solidly assumed—is considered in its present precarious imbalance. It is for Mr. Heller not any discrepancy between the "truth" of thought and the intensity of poetry which, as T. S. Eliot once argued, vitiates much modern writing, but the dissociation of feeling from thought; and if Rilke speaks of his contemporaries as the "disinherited children, to whom no longer what's been, and not yet what's coming, belongs," he deplores precisely that fatal severance of faith from sensibility to which every one of Mr. Heller's essays directs itself. Both Nietzsche and Rilke sought to discover how the "disinherited mind" may be endowed once more with the resources that would make "this impossible life possible again"; and Nietzsche's *Superman* and Rilke's *Angel* offer "in an age dispossessed of all spiritual certainties" images of transcending coherence, by which art may "affirm, bless, and deify existence."

It is perfectly in keeping with Mr. Heller's predilection for cultural criticism rather than the specific formal achievements of poetry that he should, in passing, turn his attention to Spengler. For in *The Decline of the West* the historian's indecision as to value perspectives is attacked with Nietzschean fury; but Spengler's historical scheme ultimately fails to offer us the truth because he allows destiny to relieve the human being of his chance to shape his history. This freedom, however limited, and however oppressive, must, Mr. Heller pleads, sustain any significant poetic achievement.

If it were not for the desperate assertion of this vision of freedom even beyond all hope of realization in what may well be the worst of all possible world's, there would be no validity to the web of symbols that makes up the argument of so revealing a contemporary writer as Kafka. Mr. Heller enlists in Kafka his cardinal witness for his main thesis that in our world the gulf between meaning and practice has become literally immeasurable and has, worse still, invalidated all hitherto available perspectives of judgment. To *know*, as Nietzsche put it, that there *is* no God, yet to know also that there *must* be God—this, Mr. Heller argues, is Kafka's dilemma. The reality of this situation determines the compelling logic of Kafka's world, "an excruciatingly familiar world, but reproduced by a creative intelligence which is endowed with the knowledge that it is a world doomed forever." In *The Castle* Kafka represents symbolically a man who *believes* in absolute freedom, but cannot have any conception of it because he *exists* in a world of slavery.

This "faith that lies on the other side of despair" is the theme also of Mr. Heller's essay on the Austrian satirist Karl Kraus. In the world of that great conservative, the elements in contemporary life that threaten to dissolve any coherent vision of creativity are set forth by a modern skeptic who yet knows that "an age without any sense of religious, ethical and aesthetic order has no culture." It is this word "sense" rather than the pragmatic "content" of a value system which Mr. Heller regards as decisive. Its absence has proved immensely destructive, the "conspiracy of sobriety, scientific planning, mediocrity and human insignificance" has destroyed within us all responsibility for the monstrousness of our world. The poets of whom Mr. Heller speaks so well, knew of this tragedy of the "disinherited mind," the mind that has dissociated itself from the grasp of the whole by attaching itself either to the technical demands of the day, or to the evasions of spirituality and sentimentality.

The final essay reiterates the main positions of this iridescent book by examining "the hazards of modern poetry." Empirical knowledge, concludes Mr. Heller, offers little of ultimate truth, "uncertainty alone is ineluctably real." And this reality the poet must, today more than ever, meet and vindicate with the full recognition of its elusiveness. In the tradition of the European mind, from Pascal to Nietzsche and hence to the symbolists and surrealists, Mr. Heller decries the inflation of the real and the many "desperate investments in unreal property."

He ends his diagnosis with what may to many seem an over-confident assurance that the "new poetic realism" of our time concerns itself once again with the place and stature of man in a world of tremendous actuality. If, for Eliot, "the poetry does not matter," it is nevertheless in the *Four Quartets* that "the poetry of a poet trying to read the writings of the law that has become all but

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

illegible" liberates us from an age in which nothing mattered but poetry. The German writers whom this thoughtful book places in an important historical and philosophical context, have, Mr. Heller means to remind us, either in a Goethean or a Nietzschean way maintained the true vision of life: they have held to a view of poetry as "the definition of the state of man."

Labor's Fight with the CP

by Jack Barbash

IT IS NOW possible to view the facts of Communist penetration in American life with a moderate degree of detachment. Max Kampelman brings this detachment of time to his solid study of Communist penetration in the CIO, and he brings to bear, too, another peculiarly relevant sort of detachment—the detachment that comes from not being under the obligation or compulsion to repudiate a sinful past.

The Communist Party vs. the CIO, A study in power politics, by Max M. Kampelman (Praeger; $6).

At the height of their power drive within the CIO, Kampelman recalls, Communists "dominated 12 to 15 of the 40 international CIO unions," representing control of about 25 percent of the total CIO membership. He classifies the personnel involved in Communist penetration functionally rather than formally, under "five" (really six) main headings: the party member, the fellow-traveler, the sympathizer, the opportunist and the liberal—and "sometimes the civil-libertarian conservative." One can impute varying degrees of blame with respect to each of these types, according to his angle of vision in the matter, but in any cold appraisal of the force of Communist penetration each of these types has performed a significant role in the rise and fall of Communist power in the unions as well as in other organizations.

There were several points of access for the Communists in their ascent to commanding heights in the CIO unions. First was "a conscious drive toward colonization." There was too, Kampelman finds, the disposition among CIO leadership to "work with anyone who'll work with me." (This is John L. Lewis speaking in 1937). In this attitude can be seen reflected the general climate of opinion that differences over long-run goals did not need to exclude short-run collaboration with Communists.

But there is an inevitable breaking point in the relationship between the party and a union leader (even a Communist) who sees himself as giving priority to his trade union interests over whatever interests he may have in maintaining an alliance with the Communist forces. When the break comes, as it must, it is shattering because the Communists have no alternative except to try to annihilate their opponents, even if the opponents had been yesterday's allies.

The Communists are not infallible and individual Communists are not beyond redemption. The myth has been fostered particularly by ex-Communists that there is somehow an implacable inevitability about the aims which Communists set for themselves; that the assertion of the objective was, in due time, to be taken as the inevitable achievement of the objective.

IN point of fact, however, as Kampelman points out, it was precisely their "inflexibility and rigidity" in behalf of the Soviet Union that "made it possible to identify Communist trade union leaders and thus strengthen those who would negate their influence."

Whether or not Communist leaders can be unseated by reverse "boring from within" is a matter of expediency rather than universal law. In part this depends on how secure the Communist hold is on the union. Quill in the Transport Workers' Union and Curran in the National Maritime Union were able to destroy party control from within. Reuther was able to reduce Communist influence to impotence in a union which Communists did not control but in which they were probably the largest single organized force. Carey, on the other hand, had to lead his forces outside of the United Electrical Workers to establish a rival union in order to dislodge Communist influence. In other cases, such as the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers and Bridges' Longshoremen, Communist influence has, on the other hand, been proof against both internal opposition and external attrition.

The changing climate of opinion in the United States has been a large factor in the disintegration of Communist influence in the unions. The temporary parallelism between Soviet interests and American interests could no longer be used as a blind and anti-Communist investigations and legislation made the positions of individual Communists less tenable. But the real thrust in the disintegration of Communist influence came from action by the trade union movement itself — specifically by the CIO—in expelling unions, in setting up rival unions, and in giving aid and comfort to opposition groups within Communist-controlled unions.

KAMPELMAN, as it happens, was a man of affairs in the period in which the Communists were in some of the seats of trade union power. As an associate of Hubert Humphrey in eliminating Communist influence in Minnesota Democratic politics, he knows a good deal about his subject from first-hand experience. But one of the most admirable qualities of this study is that it refrains from self-righteous criticism of why certain trade unionists didn't know better. I hope that it is now possible to say that there was *understandable* human error on the part of many trade unionists who got themselves involved and later broke with the Communists; and that in the light of all of the circumstances these trade unionists should not be constant targets of guilt and recrimination, even if they haven't repented pubicly. Many did accept Communist dictation from base motives. Others it is clear, were honorably motivated. I think the distinction is important and it cannot be made, one way or the other, without reference to the specific facts in the case.

Kampelman recaptures much of the feverish intensity and the strong feelings that permeated the CIO in the period of Communist ascendancy and decline. He amply fulfills the commitment of his sub-title: "a study in power politics." The slogans, the caucuses, the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

demonstrations, the resolutions—they are all there. And the discernment of the role of these devices as part of the apparatus of total power is there too.

But as much as anything the capacity of free institutions to combat subversion effectively — and morally — is the most impressive lesson that emerges from this book. Fundamental to this capacity, as Kampelman tells us, were the traditions of the American labor movement—

> quite hostile to the philosophy of Communism. The philosophy of the American labor movement, insofar as it is possible to speak of its philosophy, is one of humanism. This explains why it is that the American labor movement has not considered itself as representative of narrow class or sectional interests, but rather of the broad mass of the population. . . . The Communist Party could not successfully adjust to the prevailing philosophy of humanism within the American labor movement.

Looking back, the era of Communist power in the CIO has all the characteristics of a nightmare rivalled only by the garishness of the counter-Communist era and the still incalculable damage that has been inflicted on the morality of public life.

High Noon in Victorian England

by William J. Newman

SOME BOOKS are interesting despite their author and *Taine's Notes on England* is one of them. Taine was a dogged observer, and his determination to "do" England is so painfully evident that in the process he reveals a Victorian trait—the inability to leave well enough alone. He tells us for example that at each desk in the British Museum of the 1860's there were two pens, one quill, the other steel. He also tells us that in his room in a country house there was a carpet covering the whole floor, oil cloth before the wash stand as well as two dressing tables both with drawers. One dressing table had a large pitcher, a small pitcher, and a medium sized pitcher. Who said the French were flighty?

Taine's Notes on England, translated with an introduction by Edward Hyams (Essential Books; $6).

Nevertheless it is this annotation and accumulation of detail which gives the book its value. Taine provides for the reader of today a sense of the *quality* of English life (mainly middle and upper class) at the High Noon of Victorian England — if one can speak of High Noon in connection with England. Taine is no de Tocqueville, but one emerges from his *Notes* with the feeling that one knows what it must have been like to live in England in the 1860's, what the people looked like and how they might behave—even how the climate felt (Taine is strong on the climate; he considers it one of the great errors of England).

Here, then, is the character, neatly laid out, of those who were running England at the peak of her power and just before the double disaster of working-class suffrage in 1867 and the long depression of the 1870's. What were they like, these creators of England's undisputed supremacy? One thing they had in common with the Charlie Wilsons of our own day: they liked money. They liked money, according to Taine, not only because wealth is enjoyable as it piles up (the Scrooge complex), but also because it provides an outlet for action. And if this middle-upper class is virtuous it is also capable of debauchery; there is no demi-monde, Taine notes with some alarm. As for the public school education of these masters, it is composed of one part freedom, one part brutality, and no part intellectual endeavor. Again the emphasis is on doing, striving, practical action (this sounds like an Englishman writing about America today). As Taine puts it: for an Englishman "a truth has no value unless it leads to useful applications in practice." But there is a price to be paid for the ethics of achievement: the Englishman is vulgar.

They are vulgar not only because they are money-mad, but also because they are class snobs (cf. V. S. Pritchett: "our

For Classroom Use This Semester

COMMUNIST CHINA
A SPECIAL REPORT

Widely Recommended *

The Most Authoritative Recent Assessment of Mao's China

Articles By Ten Experts, Including Three European Reporters Back From China:

Robert Guillain
(*Le Monde*)

Richard Hughes
(*The Economist*)

Peter Schmid
(*Die Weltwoehe*)

Copies are now available at the special classroom rate of 10 cents each. Address your request to:

Classroom Department
THE NEW REPUBLIC
1244 19th St. N.W.
Washington 6, D. C.

**First on the Foreign Policy Association's recent reading list on US China policy* (Headline Series, *November-December, 1957*).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

snobbery has very frequently been vulgar."). And it is just at this point that the reason for Taine's interest in England emerges. For in back of Taine's meanderings is his search for the success of the English in combining both progress and stability. He sees that the vulgarity of money-cum-snobbism is simply the reverse side of a social system which preserves control in the face of the destructive force let loose by the French Revolution. Taine is not writing just a travel book; it is one of a long line of attempts to shore up society against the onslaught of democracy before it is too late.

Democracy's wings could be heard beating all too loudly in the 1860's, and Taine was happy to discover in England a social structure which could smother the popular will. The nation, according to Taine, was in good hands, in the hands of an upper class of gentlemen. For what is an English gentleman he asked? A man of money who "commands obedience here." The social structure was solid; respect for and a profound sense of hierarchy produced a society where the few lead and the others accept.

There were others of course who had the same thoughts about the way to social stability: Bagehot for instance with his sense of English deference. The romantic glorification of the upper class gentleman as a bulwark of social sanity was a necessity and a cliché of the time.

But romantic cliché or not, were Taine and Bagehot and others wrong to depend on the vulgarity of the gentleman to save England from the consequences of universal suffrage? For who has ruled England since 1867? The old bottle of the English gentleman may have been filled with new wine but he hasn't burst yet. The record of the English gentleman in holding power and in asserting his values over the rest of society is awesome. There has been a political labor movement in England since 1890, but it did not come to power until 1945 by which time it had itself become run by the gentleman. (It almost turned Ernie Bevin into a gentleman; it will not, of course, be able to turn Nye Bevan into one.) And after the grant of the working-class vote in 1867 for whom did the workers vote? Gladstone, Disraeli, Salisbury, Asquith, Lloyd George (a possibility there), Macdonald, Baldwin, Chamberlain, Attlee, Churchill and — Macmillan! What a crew; everyone a gentleman (in the English sense of the word).

No nation, especially England where tradition has been institutionalized into a way of escaping the present, can wipe clean the slate of its past. Taine hoped for the best, and who will say his hope has not come true? The English worker today is well-fed, well-housed and so forth; England is as socially mobile as America. But there is no one more adept at manipulating the symbols of hierarchy in order to augment their authority as the descendants of Taine's English gentleman. Every nation has its ideal. In America it is the business man; in France the peasant; in England the gentleman.

The English editor of Taine's *Notes* claims that the world Taine is describing is an alien one. An *alien* world? Or rather the matrix of England today?

EUROPE
Summer 1958—9 weeks
We'll see the usual, plus North Africa, Yugoslavia, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Berlin, and Denmark. A low priced, different kind of trip for the young in spirit who don't want to be herded around.
EUROPE SUMMER TOURS
255 Sequoia (Box N)
Pasadena, Calif.

MUSIC

Mr. Britten Turns the Screw

Almost four years after its premiere in Venice, Benjamin Britten's opera *The Turn of the Screw* has finally had its first US performance—at the YM-YWHA in New York, in a production by the Opera Department of the New York College of Music.

The libretto, by Myfanwy Piper, is drawn from Henry James' famous tale. Piper and Mr. Britten evidently assume that this story is as well known to moderns as the Oedipus legends were to the ancient Greeks, so very little time is wasted in describing just what is going on. However, in case you have forgotten, the action (which takes place in an English country house about a hundred years ago) revolves around a pair of very spiteful spooks and the young children whom they attempt to possess. In Mr. Piper's text, a good many of the subtleties of the original are stripped away; what is left is a well-timed and surprisingly uncomplicated ghost-story. As a contrived and artificial form of theatre, opera lends itself to treatment of the supernatural, and here the whole business of haunting is presented in the most straightforward manner imaginable.

Mr. Britten continues to employ a style and method of composition reminiscent of Puccini and Strauss—and of his American colleagues, Menotti and Barber. But in their operatic works, these three contemporaries resemble each other more than they do their spiritual forebears. I wish that there were a good, sensible name for their school — "neo-romantic" and "post-romantic" are perfectly applicable terms, but don't convey enough of the flavor of their operas. The salient characteristic of their operatic work is continuous recitative, highly-inflected and richly harmonized. Its next most pronounced quality is a harmonic eclecticism which uses late-romantic harmony as a point of departure. These composers may, for instance, go back as far as the 16th Century for transparent harmonic effects; or they may use modern techniques with high saturations of dissonance at climactic points. But such textures as these are always introduced by them into a musical fabric which is, fundamentally, late-19th-Century in its organization.

The continuous recitative is, of course, an outgrowth of the *versimo* movement in the Italian opera of sixty-odd years ago.

The technique itself was evolved as a means of escaping from the recitative-and-aria conventions of classical opera and has the advantage of allowing the drama to unfold rapidly. But the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

disadvantages of this approach become clearer with each new work exploiting it:

First, recitative demands clear diction; and it seems to be a practical impossibility to collect a whole cast of singers who can project their works coherently throughout an evening. Even under the best conditions, about ten percent of the text will be lost; and, the more words you have, the more you are likely to lose. In classical opera, of course, the composer simply clears the decks for the recitative: the orchestra stops playing, somebody swats the harpsichord, and the singer projects his lines with a minimum of interference. And in the classical arias themselves, where the singer is accompanied by the orchestra, the words are usually repeated several times. But in a modern recitative-opera, the singer gets such vigorous support from the orchestra at almost all times that there is some question as to exactly who is supporting whom.

Second, in continuous recitative, the individual words have to carry a burden of meaning heavier than they can comfortably bear. Now, the first thing that happens when you set a phrase to music is that you slow it down and in some way tamper with its natural rhythm. Words going by in slow-motion tend to take on an emphasis that was never meant by the author, and in the kind music where the whole nature of the style is to wring every word dry, the very intensity of the vocal expression tends, first, to get monotonous—then faintly comic. Small-talk sounds particularly funny in an opera of this sort; and, on a purely technical level, provides a serious obstacle to building effective climaxes.

Third—and worst—continuous recitative is an obstacle to coherent musical structure. For unless the sung line has some sort of thematic use or profile, it's bound to seem diffuse. The only ways I know to dispel this illusion of shapelessness in a recitative-opera are to give all the themes to the orchestra and apply the recitative line as a superscription to an otherwise-self-contained symphonic structure (as in most of Barber's *Vanessa*), or else to use aria substitutes (as in most of Menotti). I don't know why anybody wants to scrounge around looking for an aria-*substitute* when it would be simpler and probably more to the point just to write an aria. But I do know that if there isn't sufficient contrast to give the illusion of a scheme, a work is likely to seem improvised. And pretentious.

It is in solving the problem of building a coherent form, with lots of variety and still a strong continuity, that Britten has been most successful in *The Turn of the Screw*. His text consists of a prologue and sixteen scenes, divided into two acts. The scenes are ingeniously contrived to follow each other with a minimum of time-consuming changes of decor, so that the pacing of the opera is quick. Furthermore the scenes themselves are of manageable symphonic length, so that Britten has a chance to introduce new materials and a change of texture with each scene, and also to provide an attractive set of interludes between them. The result is an engrossing retelling of the old tale.

THAT the US premiere of this opera should be undertaken by a school instead of a professional opera company is, I think, a sign of new vitality in our musical life. For many years now, and throughout the country, opera departments and opera workshops have taken up the burden (put down by the Metropolitan) of staging new operas. Most modern operas do not adapt themselves either to the star system or the budgetary problems of a professional American opera company; and as long as the supply of new works exceeds the demand of the big houses, it is gratifying that the schools are taking over the job of staging them.

The thing most apparent from this production of *The Turn of the Screw* was that it was Ready. Everybody was well-rehearsed—the singers, the orchestra, even the stage hands. The conductor, Sigfried Landau, was securely in command of the whole thing; Albert Felmar's staging was expert; the singing was uniformly high in quality. Aside from the hoopla of a Metropolitan premiere, I don't know what more you can ask.

ROBERT EVETT

Notes on Contributors

VICTOR LANGE is professor of German at Princeton. JACK BARBASH, professor of labor education at the University of Wisconsin, is the author of *Labor Unions in Action*. WILLIAM J. NEWMAN is an American historian living in England.

AUTHORS WANTED BY N. Y. PUBLISHER

New York, N. Y.—One of the nation's largest book publishers is seeking manuscripts of all types—fiction, non-fiction, poetry. Special attention to new writers. If your work is ready for publication, send for booklet RP—*it's free.* Vantage Press, 120 W. 31st St., New York 1. (Midwest Office: 220 So. Michigan Ave., Chicago 4, Ill.)

RUSSIAN JAZZ!
Collector's Conversation Piece!
Recordings obtained on my recent USSR tour, current Soviet Jazz Hits in such famous nite-spots as Moscow's fabulous Praha Restaurant, pressed exclusively on quality unbreakable 12" LP (33-1/3) record. Absolutely unavailable elsewhere: **14 Selections $5!**
POSTHAUS,
Dept. R, P.O. Box 1414, Los Angeles 53, Calif.

"IT'S JUST PLAIN COMMON SENSE"
* To invest for extra safety, extra profit in BANK STOCKS
* For all funds, plans, reserve funds, etc., invest in BANK STOCKS
* Our selection of big city BANK STOCKS have many that earned as much as 11 percent in 1957

Write the Bank Stock Specialists:
Maxwell May Co., 17 East 55th Street, New York 22, N. Y.
"IT'S JUST PLAIN COMMON SENSE TO INVEST IN BANK STOCKS"

READERS OF THE NEW REPUBLIC ! AMERICA NEEDS YOUR INFLUENCE.
Let us send you important questions to vote on each month. Then we will send a summary of the results to you and TO EVERY MEMBER of Congress. Negligible Cost. (33¢ per month including our monthly publication.) Free details. Free trial. POLL-NR2, 430 S. Michigan, Chicago 5, Ill.

MAN AND HIS CREATIVE MIND AVAILABLE FOR PUBLIC SERVICE
● Veteran creative thinker, practitioner communication arts, offers his seasoned abilities to foundation, group association, social service.
● Broad experience, multiple technical skills. Planner, campaign copywriter, visual aids designer; fact researcher, publicist, news secretary; house organ editor; director public events; activator policy program.
● Knowledgeable senior citizen, responsible decision maker; well read, well informed, well mannered, well spoken. To right organization, manpower buy for now. MRB, c/o The New Republic.

"Evolution of an American Communist—Why I Quit after 27 years" by John Gates. 25 cents per copy. Send remittances to John Gates, 1236 Pacific Street, Brooklyn 16, New York.

OLD BOOKS FOUND. CATALOGS issued. Our specialty, Spanish books, but we try to stock good books on all subjects. El Cascajero, the old Spanish book mine, 164 Lexington, New York 16.

BRITISH BOOK BARGAINS—ALL SUBJECTS. Catalogues free. Transbooks, Box 1—NR, Wantagh, New York.

BRITISH SHOES FOR GENTLEMEN at a fraction of their American retail price! $10.95 includes duty and import charges. Delivery in ten days from receipt of order. Unconditional money-back guarantee. Write for free illustrated catalogue. Steven Williams, Jr., Ltd., 40 Chatham Road, Short Hills, New Jersey.

CLASSIFIED RATES

Per word (single insertion)	12c
Per word 6 times in one contract year	11c
Per word 13 times in one contract year	10c
Per word 26 times in one contract year	9c
Per word 52 times in one contract year	8c

NEW REPUBLIC
1244 Nineteenth St. N.W., Wash. 6, D.C.

PRINTED BY NATIONAL PUBLISHING CO. 301 N ST., N. E., WASHINGTON 2, D. C. 7

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"Until some unmistakable portent comes along, such as Nixon's resigning his office and going to Africa as a missionary, common sense requires the hypothesis that he has not changed."

●

MARGARET HALSEY'S article in the January 13 issue of *The New Republic*—"Beware the Tender Trap"—has aroused nationwide discussion

●

Reprints Now Available

Single copy 10 cents
10 copies 75 cents
25 copies $1.50
50 copies $2.50

●

THE NEW REPUBLIC
1244 19th St. N. W.
Washington 6, D. C.

Correspondence

(Continued from page 3)

implied by innuendo in a recent issue that Sherman Adams was deeply involved in the current FCC scandal. The best piece of reporting on this incident is a recent editorial in the *Washington Evening Star:*

> The "case" against Sherman Adams in the matter of North American Airlines, as it has been developed by Dr. Schwartz, strikes us as being about as thin as thin can be.
>
> On June 26, 1953, Adams wrote a letter to Murray Chotiner, one of Vice President Nixon's campaign managers . . . Mr. Adams wrote that he had gone over the matter carefully with the then acting chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board. Mr. Adams also said that North American, if dissatisfied with the CAB ruling, could appeal to the courts . . . The CAB ruled against North American; the case was taken to the courts, and the courts upheld the CAB.
>
> Just where is "the gross impropriety"? The Adams letter seems to us to be a polite brush-off. Certainly he did not influence the CAB, and he did not tell Chotiner anything that the latter, as a lawyer, did not already know.
>
> What all of this adds up to, in our opinion, is another example of the smear at work . . . The headlines proclaim that Mr. Adams has done something grossly improper. But when one wades through the transcript of the testimony it is clear that Mr. Adams did nothing to control the CAB decision, and did nothing to rescue either Mr. Chotiner or his airline client.

The most deplorable and dangerous tactic which Senator McCarthy used so devastatingly in his heyday was to attack an individual by innuendo when there was absolutely no basis of fact for the attack. Often an innocent man's reputation and career were ruined by these tactics.

Aren't you employing McCarthy's same methods in this instance when you attack Adams by implying that he has used improper influence with the FCC when there is absolutely no basis of fact for this?

I happen to know Sherman Adams well enough to say without hesitation that his honesty, integrity, moral and ethical standards are the highest.

PERKINS BASS
The House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

The New Republic welcomes communications from its readers in regard to subjects of current interest. Those of 300 words or less lend themselves to publication more readily than longer letters.

► *Taxes & the Recession*

SIRS:

I AM NOT convinced by Professor Slichter's thesis (*NR,* March 3, 1958) that the current recession is harmless because it is concentrated in the heavy industries. On the contrary, this is precisely the earmark of the downturn in its best text book form. Nor do I quite share his confidence that capital formation must shortly turn upward because government spending and housing are rising, and because inventory reduction will come to a halt. The missing link in the argument is what will happen to consumer expenditures in the meantime, and how this will affect the other factors. While Professor Slichter's prediction may prove correct, chances are that the recession will prove more stubborn than he thinks.

For this reason, I am rather more concerned with the need for expansionary action; and in particular, I differ with his view on tax reduction. Professor Slichter asserts that the stimulating effects of tax reduction would be small, because the tax cut would be temporary. As I see it, such would be the case only to the extent that consumer expenditures depend on income anticipations rather than current income. While anticipations matter, they are hardly the only, or the primary, factor. Moreover, I find it hard to reconcile Slichter's concern with the inflationary effects of next year's deficit with his subsequent concern that Federal Reserve policy may be unwilling to permit enough inflation, so that increased costs may be absorbed into higher prices. As I see it, taxes should be raised again, after the economy returns to a higher level of buoyancy; and means should be found to deal with the cost-price problem in a way other than assuring the necessary degree of inflation. . . .

RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE
Department of Economics
University of Michigan

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED